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INTRODUCTION 
 
Traditionally EU law and International Arbitration have long failed to intersect, each 
field aspiring to stay indifferent towards the other. Arbitration on one hand has been 
the leading dispute settlement recourse whilst EU law, though thriving and 
expanding over a wide variety of fields in view of Member State’s harmonization has 
abstained from providing similar solutions for arbitration. Arbitral tribunals would 
rarely be the fora for the resolution of EU claims thus keeping arbitration outside the 
ambit of EU law. 
However, the significance of European market integration and the importance of 
establishing a harmonized EU legal framework have prevailed, forcing the two 
bodies of law to enter initially in contact and increasingly in conflict. In 1958, the 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, forerunner of today’s Treaty 
of European Union 1  suggested that harmonization of Member State’s private 
international law issues required a convention outside the Community law 
framework which took the form of a wholly separate convention, the 1968 Brussels 
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (hereinafter the “Brussels Convention”)2. That same year 
another Treaty of a different nature was signed- the United Nations Convention on 
the recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (hereinafter the “New 
York Convention)3, which became the cornerstone of International Commercial 
Arbitration. Both these Conventions followed their own distinct policy objectives 
supported by their respective set of principles established to ensure their 
effectiveness. While the Brussels Convention-and later Regulation-secured the free 
movement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, arbitration remained 
                                                         
1 Treaty on European Union (TEU), 1992 O.J. C 191/1 (29, July 1992). However most matters initially 
treated by the Community Treaties are now covered by the Treaty for the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), 2010 O.J. C 83 (Mar. 30, 2010). 
 
2
 1998 O.J. 1998 C27/1 (26 January, 1998). 
 
3 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (1959). 
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unregulated by EU law mainly because the already established system by the New 
York Convention was considered sufficient enough. The distance between EU law 
and international arbitration was palpable, reflecting two bodies of law failing largely 
to converge. 
The initial EEC Treaty expressly contemplated that any harmonization in the private 
international law area would fall outside the EU scope and provided for separate 
agreements on international jurisdiction as well as the enforcement of foreign 
judgments among the Member States. Even when the 1992 Maastricht Treaty 
encompassed private international law, it relegated it to the third pillar on justice 
and home affairs, which operated in an inter-governmental level, rather than 
engulfing it in the first pillar. Only with the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam4 was private 
international law finally integrated in the first pillar consecutively leading to the 
transformation of the 1968 Brussels Convention to the 44/2001 Council Regulation, 
a EU law instrument of direct applicability5. 
 
I. THE OLD REGIME AND ITS RECURRENT PROBLEMS  
 
The 1968 Brussels Convention although an instrument addressing core issues of 
international private law, contained an express exclusion of matters related to 
arbitration from the Community legal framework6. In other words, the Convention 
did not address the exercise of jurisdiction by arbitral tribunals or the recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards. This exclusion though, conveyed more than just 
the indication that it was impossible to deal with arbitration with an instrument 
addressing jurisdiction and recognition of court judgments, whilst the two areas of 
                                                         
4 Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997 O.J C 340/1 (Nov. 10, 1997), amending the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, art. 65. 
 
5 George A. Bermann, Navigating EU law and the Law of International Arbitration, Arbitration 
International, Kluwer Law International 2012, Volume 28, Issue 3, p.397-445. 
 
6
 Brussels Convention, supra n. 2, art. 1 (“The Convention shall not apply to: Arbitration”). A 
comparable provision is found in the Lugano Convention. 
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law where utterly heterogeneous: the convention was understood also to exclude 
questions related to judicial jurisdiction and the recognition or enforcement of 
judicial judgments such as the underlying claim or judgment related to arbitration-
notwithstanding arbitration agreements, arbitral proceedings or arbitral awards. The 
Member States were of the opinion that the existing international conventions, in 
particular the New York Convention, provided a sufficient framework to ensure the 
proper and effective development for arbitration7. When in 2000, the Convention 
was transformed into secondary EU legislation taking the form of the Brussels I 
Regulation8, the drafters decided to keep in place the carve-out created for 
arbitration cases in the courts. The Court9 on the other hand was of the opinion that 
the exclusion of arbitration was due to the existence of “many international 
agreements”10 on arbitration by the time the Brussels Convention was adopted. 
According to some commentators this was a “clear and logical” justification11, whilst 
others where of a different opinion12. However this justification appears rather 
inaccurate since the New York Convention is more concerned with the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign awards and less with jurisdiction. The Brussels 
                                                         
7 Jenard Report, Official Journal C 59 (1979) 1m 13. 
 
8 Council Regulation 44/2001, 2001 OJ L12/1, 16 Jan.2001, art 1(2). 
 
9 Marc Rich & Co. AG v. Società Italiana Impianti PA, ECJ 25 July 1991, Case C-190/89, para. 17: “The 
report by the group of experts set up in connection with the drafting of the Convention (Official 
Journal 1979, C 59, p.1) explains that: “There are already many international agreements on 
arbitration. Arbitration is, of course, referred to in Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome. Moreover, the 
Council of Europe has prepared a European Convention providing a uniform law on arbitration, and 
this will probably be accompanied by a Protocol, which will facilitate the recognition and enforcement 
of arbitral awards to an even greater extent than the New York Convention. This is why it seemed 
preferable to exclude arbitration”.  
 
10 The Jenard Report confirmed that the “many international agreements” referred to the 1958 New 
York Convention and the 1961 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (the 
European Convention). 
 
11 G. Droz, Pratique de la Convention de Bruxelles du 27 Septembre 1968, in (1973) Dalloz Paris 12; J. 
Kropholler, Europäisches Zivilprozessrecht, Recht und Wirtschaft (Heidelberg, 2002), p. 98; U Magnus 
and P. Mankowski (eds), Brussels I Regulation (Sellier, 2007), p. 62. 
 
12 “Cette motivation, claire et logique, s’est relevée avec le temps insatisfaisante”. J.P. Béraudo and 
M.J. Béraudo, Convention de Lugano du 16 Septembre 1988, Réglement n. 44/2001 du Conseil du 22 
Décembre 2000 in Juris-Classeur, Droit International, VIII Fasc. 3000, p. 17. 
 
Arbitration and European Law 
 
4 
 
Convention and Regulation cover both and in detail jurisdiction of national courts 
along with recognition and enforcement of judgments. 
Professor Schlosser’s Report13 stated that in spite of diverging views among Member 
States as to the scope of the exclusion, no decision was taken in order to either 
delete or amend in part at least the exclusion of “arbitration” because of the 
existence of this “justification”: most of Member States, including the new ones, 
were party to the New York Convention, which though it only covers the 
enforcement and recognition of foreign awards, it provides no definition for 
arbitration, thus leaving unresolved emerging jurisdictional issues. In spite of these 
facts, much later, in April 2009, the Commission still argued that the exclusion of 
“arbitration” relied on the fact that, by then, all Member States were party to the 
New York Convention14.  
However the question as to the extent of the exclusion of “arbitration” from the 
Regulation remained unanswered, dichotomizing mainly the United Kingdom and 
the original Member States. The view of the United Kingdom extended the exclusion 
to covering all disputes, which the parties had effectively agreed should be settled by 
arbitration, involving any secondary disputes connected with the agreed arbitration. 
On the other hand, the original Member States only regarded proceedings before 
national courts as part of “arbitration” if they referred to arbitration proceedings, 
whether concluded in progress or to be started 15 . Under the interpretation 
suggested by the United Kingdom, the judgment rendered by a national court in 
spite of a valid arbitration agreement would see its recognition and enforcement in 
another Member State refused on the grounds that the judgment would fall outside 
                                                         
13 P. Schlosser, “Report on the Convention on the Association of the Kingdom of Denmark and others 
to the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
and to the Protocol on its interpretation by the Court of Justice” OJ C59/71, p.92-93, para 61. 
 
14 “Arbitration falls outside the scope of the Regulation. The rationale behind the exclusion is that the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral agreements and awards is governed by the 1958 New York 
Convention, to which all Member States are parties”. Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee on the application of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil an Commercial Matters, COM (2009) 174 final (Brussels, 21 April 2009), para. 3.7. 
 
15 Schlosser’s Report, supra n. 13, para. 61. 
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the scope of the Brussels Convention16. The ECJ’s response to the above-mentioned 
views reverberated through Europe, thus stimulating legislative reforms leading, yet 
again, to important changes. 
 
 
A.  The decisive criterion upon the arbitration exclusion and the 
danger it entailed: case law of the ECJ 
 
The Marc Rich case 
In the Marc Rich case, which has determined the scope of the arbitration exception 
in the Brussels Convention, the Court stressed that reference must be made solely to 
the subject matter of the dispute. Its interpretation went as far as to exclude 
arbitration as a whole including court proceedings ancillary to arbitration. In other 
words, the Court stressed that the appointment of an arbitrator by a national court, 
even if the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement is a preliminary issue 
must be interpreted so as to exclude the dispute from the scope of the Convention17. 
In the Marc Rich the ECJ made the distinction between the main issue and the 
preliminary issue of the proceedings. Only the main issue influences the fact that the 
proceedings fall within the scope of the Convention. The relevant criterion is thus 
the nature of the main claim. Only the subject matter of the main claim and not the 
objections raised to that claim is decisive, irrespective whether the proceedings fall 
under the arbitration exception. Appointment of arbitrators was the main issue in 
                                                         
16 Ibid., para 62. 
17 The ECJ held that: “…in order to determine whether a dispute falls within the scope of the 
Convention, reference must be made solely to the subject matter of the dispute. If, by virtue of its 
subject matter, such as the appointment of an arbitrator, a dispute falls outside the scope of the 
Convention, the existence of a preliminary issue which the court must resolve in order to determine 
the dispute cannot, whatever that issue may be, justify application of the Convention. Article 1(4) of 
the Convention must be interpreted as meaning that the exclusion provided therein extends to 
litigation pending before a national court concerning the appointment of an arbitrator, even of the 
existence or validity of an arbitration agreement is a preliminary issue.” 
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Marc Rich, which is certainly ancillary to the conduct of the arbitration and therefore 
covered by the arbitration exclusion18. 
The Van Uden case 
This case concerned the dispute between Van Uden Maritime BV (Van Uden) 
established in the Netherlands and Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco Line and 
Another (Deco Line) from Germany. The issue here was whether a Dutch court had 
jurisdiction to make an interlocutory order for a provisional payment against Deco 
Line while the subject matter of the dispute was discussed by an arbitral tribunal in 
the Netherlands. The ECJ expressed the opinion that whether a specific matter falls 
within the ambit of the Convention, it must be determined from the substantive 
matter of the dispute. The court held that, by referring the dispute to arbitration, the 
parties have, in regards to the Convention excluded jurisdiction by national Courts. 
Van Uden argued that provisional measures, such as the Dutch interlocutory order 
are in fact ancillary to arbitration and should be excluded from the scope of the 
Convention. The ECJ recalled the remarks of the experts’ report19, according to 
which the “Convention does not apply to judgments determining whether an 
arbitration agreement is valid or not or, because it is invalid ordering the parties not 
to continue the arbitration proceedings, or to proceedings and decisions concerning 
applications for the revocation, amendment, recognition and enforcement of 
arbitration awards. Also excluded from the scope of the Convention are proceedings 
ancillary to arbitration proceedings, such as the appointment or dismissal of 
arbitrators, the fixing of the place of arbitration or the extension of the time limit for 
making awards”. However, the ECJ held that provisional measures are not in fact 
ancillary to arbitration, but parallel to it, seeking to be measures of support. They do 
not concern arbitration as such, but a wide variety of rights that they intend to 
protect. The Court argued that in order to determine whether a provisional measure 
                                                         
18 J.P. Beraudo, The Arbitration exception of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions: Jurisdiction, 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgements, Journal of International Arbitration 18(1), 2001, p. 15; 
H. Van Houtte, Why not include arbitration in the Brussels Jurisdiction Regulation, Arbitration 
International, Vol. 21, No. 4, p. 513.  
 
19Schlosser’s Report, supra n. 13, para. 61. 
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falls within the scope of the Convention, one should determine whether the right 
that the measure aims to protect also falls within the scope of the Convention. If it 
does so, then so does the provisional measure. The core of this decision is that it has 
resulted in a different approach as to measures which are prima facie ancillary to 
arbitration and those which are parallel to it likely to even fall within the scope of 
the Convention due to the nature of the right they serve to protect20. 
In other words, the ECJ confirmed that the decisive criterion in respect to fall within 
the scope of the Regulation is the subject matter lying in the heart of the 
proceedings.  
 
i. The menace of Irreconcilable judgments due to the exclusion 
This exclusion, however, entailed several conflicting consequences. To begin with, 
the lack of harmonized jurisdictional criteria relevant to arbitration proceedings 
created uncertainty as to which Member State courts will have jurisdiction over the 
different types of proceedings that may be brought before a domestic court in 
relation to a given arbitration agreement or arbitration proceedings. This involves 
proceedings related both to the granting of measures in support of arbitration, such 
as appointing or replacing arbitrators, as well as proceedings related to the validity 
of arbitration agreements and to the validity of arbitral awards. Additionally, the 
absence of an EU-wide lis pendens rule for arbitration-related court proceedings, 
allows for concurrent proceedings to be brought in different member States on 
these matters, likely to lead to conflicting court decisions. 
The lack of a harmonized approach to the Kompetenz-Kompetenz doctrine, allows 
for concurrent proceedings before arbitrators and national courts on the validity of 
an arbitration agreement and on the merits of a given dispute submitted 
concurrently to an arbitral tribunal and to a court. The outcome can be an award 
that is irreconcilable with a judgment of a Member State court. The award will have 
                                                         
20 J. J. Van Haersolte-Van Hof, The arbitration exception in the Brussels Convention: Further 
Comment, Journal of International Arbitration 2001, vol. 18, no. 1, p.28. 
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to be recognized pursuant to the New York Convention, while the judgment will 
circulate pursuant to the Regulation. 
The third occurring problem brings up the question that if a court adjudicates a 
dispute because it has deemed an arbitration agreement invalid, can recognition and 
enforcement of that judgment be refused in another Member State on the ground 
that the arbitration agreement was valid and therefore excluded from the 
Convention? The Evrigenis Report21 states that the “verification of an incidental 
question of an arbitration agreement which is cited by a litigant in order to contest 
the jurisdiction of the court before which he is being sued pursuant to the 
Convention, must be considered as falling within its scope”. In other words, this 
passage supports the view, according to which the Convention applies “to 
recognition and enforcement of a judgment which disposes of a dispute within the 
scope of the Convention after giving a decision on the validity of an arbitration 
agreement. An alternative view was supported by Advocate-General Darmon in the 
March-Rich case, according to which a judgment on the merits given in breach of an 
arbitration agreement can be refused22. However, Advocate-General Léger in the 
Van Uden case23 stated that if the initial Court has decided as to the scope of the 
Convention, there should be no room for the enforcing Court to review this decision 
and it should therefore abide by it. 
The West Tankers case 
The ECJ’s judgment on West Tankers24 has been one of the most controversial ones 
and certainly one of the decisions that set in motion the wheels for the review of the 
Brussels I Regulation. In its article 27 the Brussels Regulation provides that “Where 
proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same parties are 
brought in the courts of different Member States, any court other than the court 
                                                         
21 Evrigenis Report on the Accession of the Hellenic Republic to the Community Convention on 
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, OJ C298, 24.11.86. 
 
22 Advocate-General Darmon in March-Rich, see J. Hill, The Law Relating to International Commercial 
Disputes, p. 64 
 
23
 Van Uden Maritime BV v Komanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco Line, Case 391/95, 1998.  
 
24 Allianz SpA v. West Tankers Inc., Case C-185/07, [2009] E.C.R. 1-663. 
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first seized shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the 
jurisdiction of the court first seized is established”. Article 1(2)(d) of the Brussels 
Regulation provides that arbitration is excluded from its scope. The issue revolved 
around the question whether the Brussels I Regulation forbids a Court of a Member 
State to make an order to stay court proceedings before the courts of another EU 
Member State on the ground that such proceedings would infringe an arbitration 
agreement. The case concerned the collision of a vessel owned by West Tankers Inc. 
and chartered by Erg Petroli SpA with a jetty in the port of Syracuse in Italy. The 
charterparty was governed by English law and the contract contained a clause 
providing for arbitration in London. Erg received money from its insurers for 
damages related to the collision and began arbitration proceedings in London 
against West Tankers for the excess. West Tankers denied liability. Erg's insurers 
then issued subrogation proceedings in Italy against West Tankers to recover the 
sums they had paid to Erg. In response, West Tankers started proceedings in the 
English High Court for an anti-suit injunction preventing insurers from pursuing the 
Italian proceedings in breach of the London arbitration clause. In March 2005, the 
High Court granted the injunction. Erg's insurers appealed to the House of Lords 
which in turn referred to the ECJ the question as to whether it was consistent with 
the Brussels Regulation for a court of a Member State to make an order to restrain a 
person from conducting proceedings in another Member State on the ground that 
such proceedings where in breach of an arbitration agreement. The ECJ, endorsing 
the much criticized Opinion of Advocate-General Kokott, held that anti-suit 
injunctions granted in view of giving effect to arbitration agreements are 
incompatible with the Brussels Regulation. Although arbitration is not within the 
scope of the Brussels I Regulation, the Court stated that anti-suit injunctions 
nevertheless have consequences, which undermine its effectiveness and the general 
principle that every court, which receives an appeal determines, under the rules 
applicable to it25, whether it has jurisdiction under the Regulation26. The judgment 
                                                         
25
 West Tankers, cited supra 20, para. 28, 29, 30 “… Accordingly, the use of an anti-suit injunction to 
prevent a court of a Member State, which normally has jurisdiction to resolve a dispute under Article 
5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001, from ruling, in accordance with Article 1(2)(d) of that regulation, on 
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triggered a flood of diverse reactions27 and its variety of implications have been 
debated extensively, especially in the United Kingdom which has a long practice of 
issuing anti-suit injunctions regarded as a valuable asset in the hands of a court 
exercising supervisory jurisdiction over an arbitration28. 
ii. Lis alibi pendens: The prior in tempore principle 
The rationale of this judgment lies in the fact that the EU approach to jurisdiction 
uses the lis pendens rule29. The lis pendens contains a formal criterion to avoid 
parallel proceedings: if another court is already seized of a matter, the second court 
seized must decline jurisdiction. The purpose of this jurisdictional criterion is to 
ensure predictable, certain and neutral litigation outcomes30. In quest of “a clear and 
effective mechanism for resolving cases of lis pendens” 31, this rule embodied in the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
the very applicability of the regulation to the dispute brought before it necessarily amounts to 
stripping that court of the power to rule on its own jurisdiction under Regulation No 44/2001. 
 It follows, first, as noted by the Advocate General in point 57 of her Opinion, that an anti-suit 
injunction, such as that in the main proceedings, is contrary to the general principle which emerges 
from the case-law of the Court on the Brussels Convention, that every court seized itself determines, 
under the rules applicable to it, whether it has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute before it …  
Further … such an anti-suit injunction also runs counter to the trust which the Member States accord 
to one another’s legal systems and judicial institutions and on which the system of jurisdiction under 
Regulation No 44/2001 is based …” 
26 Case C-185/07 Allianz SpA v. West Tankers Inc. (2009) ECR I-663, annotated by A. Giannakoulias and 
H. Meidanis, 46 CML Rev. (2009), 1709-1724, para 29. 
 
27 See the online symposium hosted by conflictoflaws.net (<conflictoflaws.net/2009/west-tankers-
online-symposium/>) as well as Hess, “Improving the interfaces between arbitration and European 
procedural law-the Heidelberg Report and the European Commission’s Green Paper on the reform of 
the Resulation Brussels I”, (2010) Les Cahiers de l’arbitrage, 17; Radicati di Brozolo, Arbitration and 
the draft revised Brussels I Regulation: Seeds of home country control and of harmonization?, Journal 
of Private International Law (2011), 423. 
 
28 Opinions of the Lords of Appeal for the judgment in West Tankers Inc v RAS Riunione Adriatica di 
Sicurta SpA and others (2007) UKHL 4(19), 21 February 2007. 
 
29  Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction , 27 MICH . J. INT’L  L. 1003, 1008 (2006). 
 
30  Anna Gardella & Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, Civil Law, Common Law and Market Integration: The 
EC Approach to Conflicts of Jurisdiction , 51 AM  J. COMP . L. 611, 615 (2003). 
 
31 Considerando XV of the Regulation 44/2001 
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Brussels I Regulation32 operates on a “first-come, first-served” basis: In Erich Gasser 
GmbH v. MISAT Srl33 the ECJ confirmed that the lis pendens rule of the Brussels I 
Regulation requires the court second seized to suspend proceedings until the court 
first seized has established or declined jurisdiction. This entails a certain degree of 
uncertainty regarding exclusive choice of court agreements. According to the lis 
pendens rule, a party can bring a claim in a non-chosen court and thereby freeze the 
proceedings in the chosen court. This means that parties to a choice of forum 
agreement cannot be sure that the chosen court will eventually decide the case34. As 
a result, the existence and the validity of the arbitration agreement may be 
challenged before any EU Member State’s court which claims jurisdiction over the 
main proceedings under the Regulation.  
 
iii. Abusive litigation strategies: The “Italian Torpedoes” 
A special kind of forum shopping35 is the “torpedo” litigation strategy, which 
originated in intellectual property actions, and has its spiritual home in Italy36. This 
blatant tactical abuse encouraged a party in fault in patent infringement tactics to 
protect themselves by bringing proceedings before the Italian courts, renowned for 
their endemic delay37 and thereby infringe any claims of the counterparty. In other 
                                                         
32 H. Gaudemet-Tallon, Compétence et exécution des jugements en Europe, 4th Ed. Paris, L.G.D.J 2010; 
U. Magnus and P. Mankowski, Brussels I Regulation, 2nd Ed. Sellier 2012. 
 
33  Case C-116/02, 2003 E.C.R. I-14693. 
 
34 Lukasz Gorywoda, The New Design of the Brussels I Regulation:Choice of Court Agreements and 
Parallel Proceedings, The Columbia Journal of European Law Online, http://www.cjel.net 
 
35 The Atlantic Star (1974), App. Cas. 436, 471 (Lord Simon of Glaisdale): “Forum shopping is a dirty 
word; but it is only a pejorative way of saying that, if you offer a plaintiff a choice of jurisdictions, he 
will naturally choose that one in which he thinks his case can be most favourably presented; this 
should ne a matter neither for surprise nor for indignation”. A. Lowenfeld, Forum Shopping, Anti-suit 
injunctions, Negative Declarations and Related Tools of International Litigation, 91 Am. J. Int ’l L. 314 
(1997); J. Fawcett, Forum Shopping-Some questions answered, 35 N. Ir. Legal Q. 141 (1984), p.141-
146; F. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 Tulane L. Rev. 553 (1988-1989), p. 
560-570, 571-572. 
 
36 M. Franzosi, Worldwide Patent Litigation and the Italian Torpedo, (1997) 7 E I P Rev 382. 
37 The other Member State courts where this tactic finds fertile ground are  the Belgium courts. 
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words, it invites a potential defendant to “race” to the court of a Member State 
renowned for its slow judicial proceedings and set in motion the lis pendens rule, 
thus obstructing the counterparty from seizing the chosen court. The direct 
consequence of this abusive strategy is that the chosen court has to stay the 
proceedings before it and wait until the court first seized determined its jurisdiction, 
thus leading to lengthy judicial proceedings and unscrupulous litigation tactics. 
Unfortunately the effectiveness of the “torpedo” is further enhanced by the fact that 
the ECJ38 has stressed that neither a choice of court agreement, nor an arbitration 
agreement is capable of deactivating the “first in time, first in right” rule. 
On 24 January 2012, London has won a major victory in the arbitration scene: In the 
ongoing West Tankers litigation, the Court of Appeal agreed that a declaratory 
arbitral award could be enforced as a judgment of the English Court, thus 
establishing the primacy of the declaratory award over any subsequent inconsistent 
judgment of the Italian Courts. However welcome though this decision may be, it still 
gives rise to the unavoidable question as to whether a judgment on the validity of an 
arbitral award is indeed excluded from the scope of the Regulation. 
 
B. The practice of anti-suit injunctions: panacea or anathema? 
 
Order and fairness between the States are achieved either by the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens, by which a court directly circumscribes its own jurisdiction, or by the 
granting of anti-suit injunctions, by which a court indirectly delimits the jurisdiction 
of other courts. It is the second of these two, which is of our concern. 
One of the purposes of anti-suit injunctions is to stop parallel proceedings, that is, to 
stop parties from pursuing litigation involving the same parties and the same claims 
in two different jurisdictions simultaneously. It is a practice long asserted by the 
English courts that mainly contributes to the enforcement of arbitral agreements by 
enjoining the other party from commencing or continuing litigation in a foreign 
jurisdiction. The right of the English courts is based on the idea that English courts 
have the power to restrain a person who is subject to their jurisdiction from 
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commencing proceedings in a foreign court. Although the principle of judicial 
protection should prevent bad faith jurisdictional challenges brought before a 
national court in breach of a valid arbitration agreement, regrettably it is common 
practice for the respondent in arbitration to derail and ‘torpedo” the arbitration 
agreement. This is the “raison d’être” of anti-suit injunctions. In Turner v. Grovit39, 
the ECJ confirmed that anti-suit injunctions are incompatible with the Brussels I 
Regulation, even where the party is acting in bad faith with a view to frustrating the 
existing proceedings, and that because they interfere with the jurisdiction of foreign 
courts. Such an interference undermines the principle of mutual cooperation which 
is the backbone of the EU jurisdictional system. The ECJ held that the effect of anti-
suit injunctions amounts to stripping a court of the power to rule on its own 
jurisdiction. What should be noted though, is that anti-suit injunctions are in fact 
personal injunctions, addressed to a party and not the other court, therefore they do 
not affect per se the foreign court’s jurisdiction40. However, the thorny issue remains 
unresolved: Since anti-suit injunctions are assessed to be a harassment to a EU 
Member State’s judicial system, how does a party who has agreed to resort to 
arbitration prevent the respondent to the agreement from engaging in delaying 
tactics by having recourse to satellite litigation? 
 
C. The aftermath of the Heidelberg Report: The Commission’s 
Green Paper and proposal 
 
In September 2007 the Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I 41 
(hereinafter the Heidelberg Report) was published. The Heidelberg Report has been 
                                                         
39
 Gregory Paul Turner v. Felix Fareed Ismail Grovit, Harada Ltd, Changepoint SA, E.C.J. Judgment, 27 
April 2004, Case C-159/02, E.C.R. I-3565. 
 
40 H. Seriki, Anti-Suit Injunctions and Arbitration: A Final Nail in the Coffin, Journal of International 
Arbitration 23(1), 2006, p. 25. 
 
41 B. Hess, Th. Pfeiffer, and Prof. Dr. P. Schlosser, Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I in 
the Member States (“Heidelberg Report”), Verlag C.H. Beck München, 2008; see also Cahiers de 
l’arbitrage, Recueil Vol. IV p.151, 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_application_brussels_1_en.pdf  (sept. 2007). 
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prepared on the basis of 25 national reports, which reflected a general consensus in 
favor of the Arbitration Exception. In particular, the Heidelberg Report reflected the 
idea that the Regulation 44/2001 already ensured the “prevalence” of the New York 
Convention42, which was perceived to operate satisfactorily, and that a suppression 
of the Arbitration Exception would not enhance the effectiveness of arbitral 
agreements and arbitral awards in Europe. Still, the Heidelberg Report endorsed the 
idea of suppressing the exception. 
The Report provided for a comprehensive analysis of the issues that arose due to the 
interface between arbitration and litigation and the problems deriving from it that 
could no longer be ignored. In order to address these problems, the Report 
evaluated among other proposals, the deletion of the arbitration exclusion from the 
Regulation.  
Pursuant to article 73 of the Regulation, the Commission was to present to the 
European Parliament a Report on its application no later than five years after its 
entry into force. The Report was released in 2009 and its conclusions were based on 
the “Heidelberg Report”43. It was accompanied by a Green Paper44 the object of 
which was to examine the relationship between arbitration and judicial proceedings, 
an issue that had come under considerable scrutiny in West Tankers. 
The document provided inter alia for a partial deletion of the arbitration exception in 
view of bringing arbitration-related proceedings within the scope of Brussels I. It also 
considered allocating exclusive jurisdiction or giving priority to the courts of the 
                                                         
42 Art. 71 (1) “This Regulation shall not affect any conventions to which the Member States are parties 
and which in relation to particular matters, govern jurisdiction or the recognition or enforcement of 
judgments”. 
 
43 The Green Paper and the attached Report (COM (2009) 174) have been prepared following a study 
carried out on behalf of the Commission by an external contractor – the Institute for Private 
International Law, University of Heidelberg, by Professors Hess, Pfeiffer and Schlosser, the so-called 
“Heidelberg Report: B. Hess, Th. Pfeiffer & P.  Schlosser, The Brussels I Regulation-Application and 
Enforcement in the EU (Munich 2008) Arguments in support of the Heidelberg Report can be found in 
B. Hess, Improving the Interfaces between Arbitration and European Procedural Law-The Heidelberg 
Report and the EU Commission’s Green Paper on the Reform of the Regulation Brussels I, 1 Cahiers de 
l’arbitrage 17 (2010). 
 
44 Green Paper on the review of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters of 21.04.2009 (COM 
(2009) 175 final), s. 7. 
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Member State of the seat of the arbitration45 in relation to proceedings regarding 
the existence, validity and scope of arbitration agreements. It was also pondering 
the extension of the Regulation on provisional measures to arbitration, as well as the 
circulation of judgments on the validity of arbitration agreements and of judgments 
setting aside an award. Finally it considered providing for the refusal of 
enforcements of judgments irreconcilable with an award enforceable under the New 
York Convention. However the proposal underwent substantive criticism46 since it 
entailed the regulation of several aspects of arbitration so far governed by national 
law. But most importantly it involved the repudiation of the Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
principle and would have precluded the enforcement of annulled awards. 
The occurring problem though was that the arbitration community along with the 
European Parliament, wanted to keep the arbitration exclusion in the Brussels 
Regulation and there were far too many supporters of this view. The European 
Commission, which had been considering endorsing a partial deletion of the 
arbitration exclusion, in the face of this opposition, essentially changed its agenda. In 
2010 the Commission presented its proposal for the recast of Brussels I Regulation47.  
By fear that the inclusion of arbitration within the Regulation would only prove to be 
a Trojan horse, jeopardizing the attractiveness of arbitrating in the EU, or even the 
effectiveness of arbitration agreements, this invasive approach has been abandoned 
and in lieu the Commission restrained itself to introducing only one new rule on 
                                                         
45 The Green Paper suggests that the seat of the arbitration would be determined by reference to “the 
agreement of the parties or the decision of the arbitral tribunal”. In absence of agreement of the 
parties, however, a choice of laws rule would have to be introduced, by connecting the seat to “the 
courts of the Member State which would have jurisdiction over the dispute under the Regulation in the 
absence of an arbitration agreement”. 
46
 Ph. Pinsolle, The Proposed Reform of Regulation 44/2001: A poison pill for Arbitration in the 
European Union? (2009), Int. Arb. Law Rev. 62. 
 
47 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast) of 14.12.2010 
(COM(2010) 748 final). A further analysis of the rule on arbitration in the Commission’s original 
proposal and its implications for the New York Convention can be found in Vesna Lazic, The 
Commission’s Proposal to Amend the Arbitration Exception in the EC Jurisdiction Regulation: How 
‘Much Ado about Nothing’ Can End Up in a ‘Comedy of Errors’ and in Anti-suit Injunctions Brussels-
style, (2012) 29 Journal of International Arbitration. 
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arbitration. The aim and scope of the Commission’s proposal on arbitration was set 
out in Recital 20 in the draft revised Regulation, according to which “the 
effectiveness of arbitration agreements should also be improved in order to give full 
effect to the will of the parties. This should be the case, in particular, where the 
agreed or designated seat of an arbitration agreement is in a Member State. This 
Regulation should therefore contain special rules aimed at avoiding parallel 
proceedings and refer to the seat selected by the parties or the seat designated by 
an arbitral tribunal, by an arbitral institution or by any other authority directly or 
indirectly chosen by the parties”. Synopsizing the Commission’s intent, one would 
have to say that it aspired to the introduction of “special rules aimed at avoiding 
parallel proceedings and abusive litigation tactics”. This goal was achieved by the 
introduction of art. 29 (4), according to which, a court seized of a dispute would be 
obliged to stay proceedings if its jurisdiction was contested on the basis of an 
arbitration agreement and an arbitral tribunal has been seized of the case, or in 
cases where court proceedings relating to the arbitration agreement had been 
commenced in the Member State of the seat48. Draft article 29(4) read: “ Where the 
agreed or designated seat of an arbitration is in a Member State, the courts of 
another Member State whose jurisdiction is contested on the basis of an arbitration 
agreement shall stay proceedings once the courts of the Member State where the 
seat of the arbitration is located or the arbitral tribunal have been seized of 
proceedings to determine, as their main object or as an incidental question, the 
existence, validity or effects of that arbitration agreement. This paragraph does not 
prevent the court whose jurisdiction is contested from declining jurisdiction in the 
situation referred to above if its national law so prescribes. Where the existence, 
validity or effects of the arbitration agreement are established, the court seized shall 
decline jurisdiction. This paragraph does not apply in disputes concerning matters 
referred to in sections 3, 4, and 5 of Chapter II”.  
Draft article 33(3) read: “For the purposes of this Section, an arbitral tribunal is 
deemed to be seized when a party has nominates an arbitrator or when a party has 
                                                         
48
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast) of 14.12.2010 
(COM(2010) 748 final) arts 29(4) and 33(3). 
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requested the support of an institution, authority or a court for the tribunal’s 
constitution”. 
These two draft articles gave priority either to the arbitral tribunal in respect of the 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle or to the court of the seat of an arbitration 
agreement to decide as a main object or as an incidental question, upon the 
existence, validity or effects of the arbitration agreement when the court of another 
EU Member State had been seized. But most importantly, these two draft articles 
would have jointly ensured the avoidance of parallel proceedings initiated by two or 
more fora to the detriment of any arbitration agreement, dilatory tactics, diverging 
court judgments or irreconcilable court decisions and arbitral awards. Inter alia the 
Commission’s Proposal sought to propel expediency and legal predictability but most 
importantly it favored the dominance of the parties’ initial will: the choice of the 
seat of their arbitration should reflect their choice to submit to the jurisdiction of the 
court of the seat or defer any arising dispute regarding jurisdiction straight to the 
arbitral tribunal which pursuant to the Kompetenz-Kompetenz doctrine is in position 
of ruling upon it. 
In other words, the new provision would achieve the same effect as an anti-suit 
injunction. Under the Commission’s Proposal, this was the only matter pertaining to 
arbitration that would be part of the Brussels Regulation – everything else relating to 
arbitration would be governed by national law. This was a provision which was in 
line with article II (3) of the New York Convention and aimed to discourage parties 
from filing parallel proceedings simply to delay and harass, to infringe the 
proceedings and torpedo the other party, by enjoining the non-seat court from doing 
anything but staying the proceeding or declining jurisdiction. It is only rather 
unfortunate that by contrast with the abundance of these amendments proposed by 
the Commission, the New Regulation has not retained them and chose to adopt a 
more hesitant and skeptical approach.  
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II. THE NEW REGULATION 1215/2012 AND ITS RECURRENT 
PROBLEMS 
 
 
After a barrage of commentary and discussions on 6 December 2012, the Council of 
the European Union endorsed the proposed reform of the 44/2001 Regulation, thus 
adopting the Brussels I recast 1215/2012 Regulation. The Council though it 
abandoned the provisions suggested in article 29(4), nevertheless decided to 
introduce significant changes regarding the amended version of the proposal 
whereas the arbitration exception was retained in article 1(2)(d), which stated that 
“The regulation shall not apply to arbitration”. The revised Regulation introduced an 
elaborate and explanatory recital in view of determining the scope of the arbitration 
exception and the relationship between the Regulation and the New York 
Convention. The Committee of Legal Affairs, which prepared the Report upon which 
the Parliament decided to adopt the New Regulation stated that “The Commission is 
of the view that the effectiveness of arbitration agreements should be improved in 
order to give full effect to the will of the parties. In particular, it should be the case 
where the agreed or designated seat of arbitration is in a Member State. It 
recommends special rules aimed at avoiding parallel proceedings and abusive 
litigation tactics in those circumstances. Regarding this point, the Committee 
adheres to the position taken by Parliament in its resolution on the Green Paper: 
arbitration is satisfactorily dealt with by the 1958 New York Convention and the 1961 
Geneva Convention on International Commercial Arbitration. All Member States are 
parties to the abovementioned conventions; therefore the exclusion of arbitration 
from the scope of the Regulation should be preserved. Recital 11 and following 
above clarify this.”49  
After the West Tankers decision the threat of torpedo actions became more of a 
predicament that a potential impediment to arbitration within the European Union. 
The hazardous affair of parties having recourse to parallel court proceedings gave 
                                                         
49 The Committee on Legal Affairs of October 15, 2012 on the proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) (COM(2010)0748—C7-0433/2010—
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rise to the risk of inconsistency between an arbitral award and a court judgment. 
This would only lead to conflicting decisions where a Member State court would 
have to fulfill its obligations under the Brussels I Regulation and enforce a judgment 
of another Member State court, whereas an arbitral award would have to be 
enforced according to the provisions of the New York Convention. 
During the years of debate regarding the revisions of the Brussels I Regulation, the 
EU institutions considered tackling the Italian torpedo phenomenon directly. 
However the feedback by the arbitration community was that the problem needed 
to be dealt indirectly, choosing to insert to the new Regulation as limited changes as 
possible. 
 
A. A skeptical approach of the arbitration exception issue: the 
meaning of recital 12 
 
Although in the Commission’s Proposal the issue of arbitration was intended to be 
addressed both in the preamble and by the insertion of two substantive provisions 
on lis pendens, the approach of the 1215/2012 Regulation50 has proved more 
skeptical. The arbitration exception is preserved pursuant to article 1(2)(d), but is 
also reiterated in the preamble and its recital 12, which further defines and delimits 
the scope of the arbitration exception. Recital 12 reads as follows: 
“This Regulation should not apply to arbitration. Nothing in this Regulation should 
prevent the courts of a Member State, when seized of an action in a matter in 
respect of which the parties have entered into an arbitration agreement, from 
referring the parties to arbitration, from staying or dismissing the proceedings, or 
from examining whether the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed, in accordance with their national law. 
A ruling given by a court of a Member State as to whether or not an arbitration 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed should not 
be subject to the rules of recognition and enforcement laid down in this Regulation, 
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 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(recast) (2012) OJ L351/1. 
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regardless of whether the court decided on this as a principal issue or as an 
incidental question. 
On the other hand, where a court of a Member State, exercising jurisdiction under 
this Regulation or under national law, has determined that an arbitration agreement 
is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, this should not 
preclude that court’s judgment on the substance of the matter from being 
recognized or, as the case may be, enforced in accordance with this Regulation. This 
should be without prejudice to the competence of the courts of the Member States 
to decide on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in accordance with 
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
done at New York on 10 June 1958 (the 1958 New York Convention), which takes 
precedence over this Regulation. 
This Regulation should not apply to any action or ancillary proceedings relating to, in 
particular, the establishment of an arbitral tribunal, the powers of arbitrators, the 
conduct of an arbitration procedure or any other aspects of such a procedure, nor to 
any action or judgment concerning the annulment, review, appeal, recognition or 
enforcement of an arbitral award.” 
According to the first paragraph of recital 12, arbitration is unequivocally out of the 
scope of the Regulation, leaving Member State courts free to refer the parties to 
arbitration, to stay or dismiss the proceedings and to examine whether there is a 
valid arbitration agreement in place. In other words the Regulation does not wish to 
interfere with Member State’s national law. The Regulation does not establish a 
uniform regime vis-à-vis arbitral matters, but instead entrusts national lawmakers to 
enact the appropriate legislation on arbitration whilst complying with the New York 
Convention. It has been argued that this first paragraph of recital 12 “allows for the 
courts of the seat to rule on the validity of an arbitration agreement, even if this 
issue has already been raised before another court”51. However it seems that others 
are of the opinion that paragraph I “simply excludes the application of the 
Regulation and leaves unaffected the governing national laws of Member States” 
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without granting preference to the court of the EU Member State of the seat of the 
arbitration in relation to the courts of other Member States52. On the other hand, 
one could suggest that, if a party initiates court proceedings in a Member State other 
than that of the seat, the other party may still request the courts of the seat to refer 
the parties to arbitration. Therefore, even though it is argued that the first 
paragraph does not appear to give priority to the court first seized with a question 
regarding the validity of an arbitration agreement, it is claimed that only the courts 
of the seat can impose the arbitral process.  
The second paragraph of recital 12 envisages the scenario where a EU Member State 
court renders a decision concerning the validity of an arbitration agreement. 
Irrespective of whether the court decided upon the matter as a principal issue or as 
an incidental question, paragraph II of the recital expressly excludes this ruling from 
the scope of the Regulation. In other words, the Recital explicitly draws a line of 
distinction between a court ruling, which has an assessment of the effect of an 
arbitration clause as its subject matter, and a decision where this assessment forms 
only an incidental to the substance of the case consideration. Whether such a 
decision would have a binding effect on a court of another Member State would 
instead be decided by national principles of res judicata and issue estoppel53. But the 
problem still is that the same arbitration agreement could be considered valid in one 
Member State and invalid in another. The fact that arbitration is altogether excluded 
from the Regulation impedes a party from opposing the recognition of a court ruling 
rendered on the validity of an arbitration agreement in a scenario where recognition 
would have been refused, on the grounds that the ruling is irreconcilable with a 
previous decision given in another Member State involving the same parties and the 
same cause of action. In other words, the outcome can still be haphazard and 
                                                         
52 Guido Carducci, The New EU Regulation 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and 
International Arbitration: With Notes on Parallel Arbitration, Court Proceedings and the EU 
Commission’s Proposal, Arbitration International (LCIA 2013 Vol.29, Issue 3) p. 467-491. 
 
53 Not all Member States see eye to eye regarding the principles of res judicata and issue estoppel. 
See for example the UK Supreme Court’s judgment in Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding 
Company v Government of Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46 and the related judgment of the Paris Court of 
Appeal in Gouvernement du Pakistan—Ministère des Affaires Religieuses v Dallah Real Estate and 
Tourism Holding Company (Case No.09/28533). See also the House of Lords’ judgment in DSV Silo-
und Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH v Owners of the Sennar and 13 other ships [1985] 1 W.L.R. 490, HL. 
Arbitration and European Law 
 
22 
 
inconclusive. 
When read in conjunction, the first and second paragraphs of recital 12 seem to 
scrape off some of the effect of the “Italian torpedo” phenomenon. According to the 
first paragraph, one could go as far as interpret that the courts of the seat may rule 
on the validity of an arbitration agreement, even when the same issue has been 
raised before another court and the same parties have been involved. The second 
paragraph provides that, if the court of one Member State renders a decision on the 
matter, the ruling has no binding effect on other Member State courts “which are 
therefore free to make their own ruling”54. One would argue that the beneficial 
effect of these new provisions is that while parallel court proceedings may still be 
brought in different courts of EU member States, such proceedings will not prevent 
arbitral proceedings from commencing or continuing. However, the suggestion that 
pursuant to paragraph II of recital 12, the court ruling in one Member State has no 
binding effect on other Member States’ courts seems to be indifferent to the lis 
pendens rule according to which there can be no other court ruling in a second 
Member State in an identical case between the same parties regarding the same 
arbitration agreement. In other words, a party to an arbitration agreement seeking 
to avoid it will generally try to obtain a court ruling declaring the arbitration 
agreement “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed”. If the other 
party subsequently seizes another court of a Member State for the same cause of 
action in order to obtain a court ruling declaring the validity of the arbitration 
agreement, then the court second seized, pursuant to the lis pendens principle will 
have to stay its proceedings until the court first seized rules decides upon its 
jurisdiction. In other words, there cannot be second court proceedings in another 
Member State other the one first seized for the same cause of action, involving the 
same parties and with regard to the same arbitration agreement. 
The third paragraph of recital 12 explains that the rules of this Regulation would not 
interfere with the competence of Member State’s courts even though a preliminary 
decision on the validity of an arbitration agreement is in itself not within the ambit 
of the New Regulation, nevertheless the judgment on the merits of the matter 
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should still be recognized and enforced. Furthermore, this paragraph reminds that 
the New York Convention takes precedence over the Regulation, which does not 
intrude in areas where the rules on recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards 
according to the New York Convention apply. Article II (3) of the New York 
Convention provides that: “ the court of a contracting State, when seized of an 
action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an arbitration 
agreement, shall at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, 
unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of 
being performed”. Therefore, as long as the court of a contracting State deems the 
arbitration agreement valid under the applicable law, then it has no other choice but 
to refer the parties to arbitration. 
However in the hypothetical example that one party in an arbitration agreement 
(the defendant) in his quest to declare the arbitration agreement null and void seizes 
the court of a Member State, which indeed renders a decision to his liking and 
declares the arbitration agreement null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed, thus deciding to rule on the merits, then this decision would have to 
circulate pursuant to the rules laid down by the New Regulation. But if for instance 
the claimant in this very same example decides to initiate arbitration proceedings, 
where the arbitral tribunal enjoys the power to rule upon its own jurisdiction, 
according to the Kompetenz-Kompetenz doctrine and decides to render an arbitral 
award which is contrary to the previous court ruling, then it would have to be 
enforced in accordance with the rules laid down by the New York Convention. The 
problem here is unequivocal: Which one takes precedence? And although it has 
been suggested that at the end of the third paragraph, the new recital perhaps 
solves the problem of conflicting court judgments and arbitral awards ruling on the 
same substantive issue because it stipulates that the New York Convention takes 
precedence, is it possible that this interpretation goes a step too far? Although by 
virtue of article 71 of the New Regulation, the New York Convention prevails, this 
would only be the case when two colliding decisions are submitted before the same 
national authority. However, it could hardly be the case of a court ruling and an 
arbitral award pending before different Member State courts. The risk of incoherent 
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decisions and the uncertainty regarding the primacy of the New York Convention 
arises from the fact that though Member State courts are not bound to recognize 
and enforce judgments concerning the validity of an arbitration agreement per se, 
nevertheless they are bound to recognize and enforce judgments on the merits of a 
dispute found not to be part of a valid arbitration agreement. The Court of appeal of 
Paris denied that the judgment of an Italian court rendered exclusively on the 
validity of an arbitration agreement and ruling a contrario without engaging in any 
decision making as to the merits of the dispute could rely for its recognition and 
enforcement on the Brussels Convention55.  
The last paragraph of recital 12 exempts from the Regulation both actions and 
ancillary proceedings before the courts of EU Member States, any measures that 
relate to stages of the arbitral process (such as the establishment of an arbitral 
tribunal, the extent of arbitrators’ powers, the conduct and any other aspect of the 
arbitration proceedings56) as well as those that relate to their conclusion. In other 
words this last paragraph reiterates that the arbitration exception extends to court 
proceedings in support of the arbitral process. 
The solutions brought by the New Regulation regarding the issue of contradictory 
and conflicting decisions circulating in the European Union do not seem adequate: 
the general idea is that, with reference to a dispute connected to an arbitration 
agreement, three different decisions could potentially be issued, each one of them in 
accordance with different recognition and enforcement rules: first, the arbitral 
award, which shall circulate according to the rules of the New York Convention; 
second, the decision issued on the merits by a court of a Member State, rendered on 
the acknowledged nullity, unenforceability or ineffectiveness of the arbitration 
agreement, which shall circulate following the rules of the New Brussels Regulation; 
and finally, the decision issued by a court of a Member State upon the validity or 
unenforceability of the arbitration agreement, which shall circulate according to the 
rules of the national laws of the Member State in which enforcement is sought, 
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where it encompasses the risk of undermining the effectiveness of decisions in the 
EU judicial system. 
 
B. The future of anti-suit injunctions under the new regime 
 
The new Recital 12 appears to abstain from addressing the problem that generated 
the debate in West Tankers and concomitantly gave rise to the revision process: 
court-ordered anti-suit injunctions. According to paragraph IV of Recital 12, “The 
Regulation should not apply to any actions or ancillary proceedings relating to, in 
particular, the establishment of an arbitral tribunal, the powers of arbitrators, the 
conduct of an arbitration procedure or any other aspects of such a procedure, nor to 
any action or judgment concerning the annulment, review, appeal, recognition of 
enforcement of an arbitral award”. The unavoidable question here would be if anti-
suit injunctions should be regarded as “ancillary proceedings”. An anti-suit injunction 
is aimed to protect an arbitration agreement and prevent a court to decide to the 
detriment of the parties’ will. Whilst nothing in this Regulation should prevent the 
courts of a Member State from examining the validity of an arbitration agreement, 
would it be safe to assume that court-ordered anti-suit injunctions may fall under 
the auspices of “ancillary proceedings”? If an anti-suit injunction is an “action or 
ancillary proceeding” relating to “the conduct of an arbitration procedure or any 
other aspects of such a procedure,” then it should be excluded from the scope of the 
New Regulation. This view undermines the one expressed by the ECJ in West 
Tankers, according to which an anti-suit injunction is incompatible with the Brussels 
Regulation since it “obstructs a Member State court in the exercise of the powers 
conferred on it by Regulation No 44/2001 and runs counter to the trust which the 
Member States accord to one another’s legal systems and judicial institutions and on 
which the system of jurisdiction under Regulation No 44/2001 is based”57. 
After the significant turbulence that the West Tankers has caused in the arbitration 
world, one would expect that a wording in the New Regulation concerning anti-suit 
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injunctions would be in order. It was highly anticipated that the matter of anti-suit 
injunctions would be addressed in the New Regulation. Therefore when it comes to 
anti-suit injunctions, one would expect that they would not be simply implied under 
the wording “ancillary proceedings”. Whereas Paragraph IV of Recital 12 considers 
“actions or ancillary proceedings” as any action relating to “the establishment of an 
arbitral tribunal, the powers of arbitrators, the conduct of an arbitration procedure 
or any other aspects of such a procedure, nor to any action or judgment concerning 
the annulment, review, appeal, recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award”, it 
does not encompass anti-suit injunctions. Would it be pertinent for anti-suit 
injunctions to fall within the phrasing “any other aspects of such a procedure”? 
Furthermore, one could argue that given the West Tankers decision that echoed in 
the arbitration community, the permissibility of anti-suit injunctions would require 
an express inclusion and an unequivocal legal basis in the New Regulation. In West 
Tankers, the ECJ held that an anti-suit injunction “amounts to stripping a court of the 
power to rule on its own jurisdiction under Regulation No 44/2001.”58. Since the 
Recitals in the Preamble of a EU Act are interpretative59, how could these provisions 
derogate from the actual provisions of the Regulation in the absence of any legal 
binding effect60? Thus it seems that the explicit exclusion of “actions or ancillary 
proceedings” from the Regulation does not provide for a clear legal basis for anti-suit 
injunctions. 
Additionally, even to the most fervent supporters of the opinion that Recital 12 of 
the Recast Regulation allows for anti-suit injunctions, one must be reminded that 
anti-suit injunctions are mostly issued by common law courts, whereas the vast 
majority of court systems in the European Union are civil law systems which do not 
                                                         
58
 Ibid.,para. 28. 
 
59 See for example Ordre des Barreaux Francophones et Germanophone v Conseil des ministres (C 
305/05) [2007] ECR I-5305 para.24, and Georg Heininger and Helga Heininger v Bayerische Hypo- und 
Vereinsbank AG (C-481/99) [2001] ECR I-9945 para.39. 
 
60 See for example Criminal proceedings against Gunnar Nilsson Per Olov Hagelgren and Solweig 
Arrborn (C-162/97) [1998] ECR I-07477 para.54; Deutsches Milch-Kontor v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-
Jonas (C-136/04) [2005] ECR I-10095 para.32; and R. (on the application of International Air Transport 
Association and European Low Fares Airline Association) v Department for Transport (C-344/04) 
[2006] ECR I-403 para.76. 
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particularly favor anti-suit injunctions, thus unlikely to grant them and even less 
adopt them. 
Moreover, among the solutions to the problem of parallel proceedings and abusive 
litigation tactics that the EU legislator foresaw, was clearly not the reintroduction of 
anti-suit injunctions, but a partial deletion of the arbitration exception. It is more 
than evident that the Recast Regulation has not resolved the problem of parallel 
proceedings, which precipitates the risk of incoherent judgments, and therefore 
makes arbitration less enticing, because of increased costs, legal unpredictability and 
inconsistencies. Given this situation, alternative solutions to anti-suit injunctions 
need to be consulted as a way to prevent vexatious breaches of arbitration 
agreements by parties who seek to derail the arbitral process by commencing 
litigation as a dilatory tactic. Therefore the arbitral tribunal should consider issuing 
an order that would provoke the same effect as an anti-suit injunction. One way of 
resolving this would be by granting interim measures. The UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules accords the arbitral tribunal the power to grant interim measures in view of 
protecting the arbitral process. UNCITRAL Article 26 reads as follows: 
“1. The arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party, grant interim measures. 
2. An interim measure is any temporary measure by which, at any time prior to the 
issuance of the award by which the dispute is finally decided, the arbitral tribunal 
orders a party, for example and without limitation, to: 
(a) Maintain or restore the status quo pending determination of the dispute; 
(b) Take action that would prevent, or refrain from taking action that is likely to 
cause, (i) current or imminent harm or (ii) prejudice to the arbitral process itself; 
(c) Provide a means of preserving assets out of which a subsequent award may be 
satisfied; or 
(d) Preserve evidence that may be relevant and material to the resolution of the 
dispute. 
3. The party requesting an interim measure under paragraphs 2 (a) 
to (c) shall satisfy the arbitral tribunal that: 
(a) Harm not adequately reparable by an award of damages is likely to result if the 
measure is not ordered, and such harm substantially outweighs the harm that is 
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likely to result to the party against whom the measure is directed if the measure is 
granted; and 
(b) There is a reasonable possibility that the requesting party will succeed on the 
merits of the claim. The determination on this possibility shall not affect the 
discretion of the arbitral tribunal in making any subsequent determination. 
4. With regard to a request for an interim measure under paragraph 2 (d), the 
requirements in paragraphs 3 (a) and (b) shall apply only to the extent the arbitral 
tribunal considers appropriate. 
5. The arbitral tribunal may modify, suspend or terminate an interim measure it has 
granted, upon application of any party or, in exceptional circumstances and upon 
prior notice to the parties, on the arbitral tribunal’s own initiative. 
6. The arbitral tribunal may require the party requesting an interim measure to 
provide appropriate security in connection with the measure. 
7. The arbitral tribunal may require any party promptly to disclose any material 
change in the circumstances on the basis of which the interim measure was 
requested or granted. 
8. The party requesting an interim measure may be liable for any costs and damages 
caused by the measure to any party if the arbitral tribunal later determines that, in 
the circumstances then prevailing, the measure should not have been granted. The 
arbitral tribunal may award such costs and damages at any point during the 
proceedings. 
9. A request for interim measures addressed by any party to a judicial authority shall 
not be deemed incompatible with the agreement to arbitrate, or as a waiver of that 
agreement”. 
Thus, an arbitral tribunal subject to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules could chose to 
grant an interim measure, providing the same effect as an anti-suit injunction by 
ordering a party to refrain from commencing or continuing litigation bringing the 
same issues that are to be determined in the arbitral process before a court of a 
Member State with the rationale that such litigation would likely cause either 
“current or imminent harm or prejudice to the arbitral process itself”. 
However one should note that ordering such a measure would be unlikely to have 
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the same effect as a court-ordered anti-suit injunction since any court measure 
always proves to be more efficient in imposing penalties on a recalcitrant party, 
whilst arbitral tribunals lack such coercive powers. 
Another alternative to anti-suit injunctions worth to consider is seeking damages for 
the breach of a valid arbitration agreement, but it still is a very different alternative: 
seeking damages or even according them do not stop time-consuming court 
proceedings initiated in breach of a valid arbitration agreement, neither preclude 
litigation costs nor res judicata. In the West Tankers saga some light was recently 
shed as to a tribunal’s power to impose damages61 . According to its latest 
development West Tankers asked from the arbitral tribunal that the insurers grant 
them damages for breach of the arbitration agreement, and also an indemnity to 
cover any potential liability that might be found by the Italian court. The tribunal 
dismissed the claim on the ground that its jurisdiction to award damages for breach 
of the arbitration agreement was not in accordance either with the Brussels 
Regulation or the ECJ ruling. Pursuant the ECJ’s reasoning in the 2009 West Tankers 
decision, the tribunal held that the insurers had a fundamental right under Article 
5(3) of the Regulation to bring a suit in Italy, since that was where the harmful 
incident occurred. The ECJ had made it clear that the right of a party to have access 
to a national court with jurisdiction under the Brussels Regulation was a 
fundamental right in EU law and that denial of that right was contrary to the 
principle of “effective judicial protection.” Consequently, the tribunal, refused to 
award damages against the other party for exercising a fundamental right. The 
tribunal stated that it had no jurisdiction to award damages in the event of a party 
merely seeking to rely upon a fundamental right. But was the arbitral tribunal 
deprived of jurisdiction to award equitable damages for breach of an obligation to 
arbitrate by reason of EU law? Does the ECJ ‘s judgment actually preclude an arbitral 
tribunal from making decisions or rulings, which are inconsistent with the decisions 
or rulings of the court of another Member State the same way that national Member 
State courts are precluded under the terms of the Regulation? West Tankers 
appealed to the English Commercial Court and on 4 April 2012 the High Court held, 
                                                         
61 See West Tankers Inc v. Alianz SpA & Anor [2012] EWHC 854 (Comm), 4 April 2012. 
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in a decision handed down by Flaux J., that the majority of the arbitral tribunal was 
wrong; the arbitrators did have jurisdiction to award damages for breach of the 
arbitration clause. Flaux J.’s decision was based on the opinion of Advocate Generale 
Kokott, according to which a tribunal could issue a different decision from a court, 
hence the tribunal’s jurisdiction could not be constrained by the Regulation. Flaux J. 
said that "arbitration falls outside the Regulation and an arbitral tribunal is not 
bound to give effect to the principle of effective judicial protection. It follows that 
the tribunal was wrong to conclude that it did not have jurisdiction to make an 
award of damages for breach of the obligation to arbitrate or for an indemnity." 
Therefore the principles of mutual trust and effective judicial protection upon which 
the West Tankers decision relied should not apply to arbitration since they were 
based on the Regulation. This decision of the High Court also lends support to the 
view that a tribunal should also have authority to award damages, not only for 
breach of an arbitration agreement, but also for failure to comply with a tribunal’s 
order to abstain from any action that could cause harm or prejudice to the arbitral 
process. Accordingly, an interim measure granted by a tribunal not to engage in any 
action in violation of the arbitration agreement could be much more efficient when 
accompanied by a potential award for damages. The question remains to be 
answered whether civil court systems will ever find a way to protect arbitration 
agreements even by remotely accepting some sort of an anti-suit injunction as a 
solution to the troubling reality of parallel proceedings and inconsistent judgments. 
 
C. Assessing the impact of Brussels I Recast 
 
The Recast Regulation is expected to enter to force on 10 January 2015 according to 
its article 66. And although its Recital 12 comprises a few clarifications, which are 
welcome, overall it lacks the bold approach of the Commission’s 2010 Proposal. The 
New Regulation does not take the quantum leap regarding the lis pendens 
mechanism and avoids to explore further solutions as to the risk of parallel court 
proceedings or parallel court and arbitral proceedings, thus leaving the issue of 
Arbitration and European Law 
 
31 
 
potential diverging decisions unresolved. One would have thought that the evolution 
of international arbitration on European ground would have contributed to build a 
better relationship between them but instead these two fields of law have grown 
more and more isolated with paramount and irreconcilable differences. For this very 
reason the Brussels I recast was long awaited in the light of bridging the gap. 
However the EU legislator has abstained from providing a sufficient legal basis for 
the interpretation of the arbitration exemption and opted for the status quo. The 
hypothetical reasons behind this skeptical approach differ: one would presume the 
recurring “justification” that the New York Convention and the Geneva Convention 
deal satisfactorily with arbitration, following the reasoning of the Committee on 
Legal Affairs. However this observation appears rather misplaced with regard to the 
lis pendens rule, since the provisions proposed by the Commission in 2010 did not 
stumble upon any identical operational mechanism either in the New York 
Convention or the Geneva Convention. Additionally, the debate before the 
Parliament was not whether arbitration was satisfactorily dealt with by the New York 
and Geneva Conventions, but whether there could be a more satisfactory regime to 
deal with proceedings initiated before both a court and an arbitral tribunal of two 
Member States and whether there was a need to address this situation with the 
establishment of a more uniform EU regime, such as the one proposed by the 
Commission or whether the diverging existing national legislations of each Member 
State sufficed. The New Regulation opted for the last option. 
The reason is equally unlikely to be the idea that the Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
principle that encompasses the opportunity for the arbitral tribunal to rule on its 
own jurisdiction is sufficient enough to ensure the prevention of the risk of parallel 
proceedings since it tends to operate domestically with regards to the court of the 
same country as the seat of the arbitration. In the above mentioned case of the 
Legal Department du Ministère de la Justice de la République d’Iraq62, the Genoa 
Court of Appeal found that it had jurisdiction to rule on the dispute that arose 
between three Italian Companies and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Iraq, 
despite the existence of arbitration clauses in the relevant contracts, by considering 
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that those clauses were invalid. When enforcement of the decision was sought in 
France, the Republic of Iraq challenged the enforcement order before the Court of 
appeal of Paris on the grounds that, first of all, the Brussels Convention should not 
apply to the decision rendered by the Genoa Court of Appeal, since arbitration was 
not within its scope, and second, given the exclusion of the Brussels Convention, the 
Genoa Court of Appeal did not have jurisdiction over the dispute according to the 
bilateral treaty signed between Italy and France. The Court of appeal of Paris 
decided to reverse the enforcement order and dismiss the request for enforcement, 
stating that the Brussels Convention did not apply to the decision of the Genoa Court 
of appeal and that accordingly, the court had jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the 
case.  The rationale of this decision relied to the exemption of the arbitration from 
the Brussels Convention and to the negative effect of the Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
principle. The particularly arbitration-friendly French law 63  has interpreted 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz to not only have the positive effect of allowing arbitral 
tribunals to determine their own jurisdiction, but also the negative effect of 
precluding courts from determining that they have jurisdiction over these 
issues 64 . This approach that has been codified by the French legislature in 
amendments to their Code of Civil Procedure, does not allow a French court to be 
seized until after the arbitral tribunal has had the opportunity to rule upon its 
jurisdiction65. However, rather than enhancing the extension of the negative effect 
of Kompetenz-Kompetenz to a foreign court, an arbitration friendly legal system 
should rather aspire to oppose to the recognition and enforcement in its territory of 
a judgment rendered by a foreign court in breach of an arbitration agreement. 
Therefore, in order for a legal system to promote the negative effect of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz, it should establish it as a public policy requirement adept to oppose to 
                                                         
63 Article 1448 cpc applies to both domestic and international arbitration in France but the parties 
may opt-out of this provision in international arbitration. 
64  Ph.Fouchard, E. Gaillard, B. Goldman, International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Law 
International (1996), p.396, para. 651. 
 
65 Article 1709 cpc grants a significant freedom to the tribunal with regard to the determination of the 
rules governing the proceedings. 
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any attempt of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in breach of 
arbitration agreements. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Overall, the New Brussels Regulation, though it pretends to clarify a number of 
questions regarding the interrelation between litigation and arbitration, it leaves a 
lot of issues unresolved. But these rules, incomplete or recessed from the French 
system of conflict of jurisdictions, give a new life to the old question of whether the 
ordinary law must prevail on the harmonized law since the first mentioned is more 
favorable than the second to international judicial cooperation66. On the other hand, 
this New Regulation, however inept it may appear in comparison with the 2010 
Commission’s Proposal, it has been received positively, notwithstanding the risk of 
repeated court and arbitration proceedings which is palpable since it has enhanced 
the effectiveness of choice of court proceedings. And even though it is too early to 
assess the effectiveness of this new hesitant approach, one could argue that it is at 
least a move in the right direction. 
 
                                                         
66 Jean_Paul Beraudo, Regards sur le nouveau règlement  Bruxelles I sur la compétence judiciaire, la 
reconnaissance  et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale, Journal du Droit 
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